Iran Allies Under Pressure as Conflict Spreads Across the Gulf

Contrails have recently taken the place of the customary stream of commercial jets in Abu Dhabi’s pale blue mornings. People now look up more frequently. Incoming ballistic missiles were never considered when designing the skyline, which consists of glass towers rising above well-kept boulevards. However, the question that is quietly reverberating throughout capitals as tensions rise is straightforward: who specifically supports Iran?

The loose but powerful web of Iran’s allies, which stretches from Yemen to Lebanon, has long been referred to as the “Axis of Resistance.” Hezbollah, the Iran-backed group firmly ingrained in Lebanon’s political and military environment, is at its center. Tehran has developed ties with the Houthi movement in Yemen, armed groups in Gaza, and militias in Iraq over the years. These partnerships developed gradually and were strengthened by financial support, arms transfers, and similar ideological frameworks.

However, when missiles are in the air, alliances appear differently. Hezbollah fighters and Israel have engaged in gunfire in the southern suburbs of Beirut, resulting in retaliatory strikes that tremble apartment buildings and send families running down stairwells. The group presents its activities as a form of resistance. In the meantime, the Lebanese government treads carefully, publicly separating itself while preparing for a further escalation. Hezbollah’s involvement is perceived as both expected and extremely complex.

Iran-affiliated militias have occasionally targeted American positions in Iraq, further east. However, the leadership of Baghdad seems hesitant to be drawn into a full-scale conflict. Some of Iran’s regional allies may be more concerned with risk assessment than loyalty.

Then there are China and Russia, the two superpowers of the world.

On paper, relations between Tehran and Moscow have improved recently. According to reports, Russian operations in Ukraine were aided by Iranian drones, and energy coordination has become more stringent. However, Russia’s response to the escalation of Israeli and American strikes was mainly rhetorical, with no explicit military support promised despite condemnations. After years of grueling fighting, Moscow is overburdened. It’s still unclear if the Kremlin has the resources or the desire to get more involved.

China seems to be taking a more measured approach. Beijing has called for a diplomatic solution and denounced external attacks on Iran, but it has not provided concrete support. China values oil market stability and ongoing trade with Gulf states, according to analysts. Ideological alignment may be subordinated to the preservation of economic interests. Beijing’s well-crafted statements convey a sense of strategic distance rather than unity.

Tehran officials insist on maintaining their alliances. Iranian leaders have long maintained that the United States’ naval presence in the Gulf should not be used to manage regional security. However, the conservative, security-minded, and closely aligned Gulf monarchies have demonstrated little desire to change that equilibrium.

Another layer is added by history. Prior to 1979, the shah’s Iran was regarded as a cornerstone of the Gulf’s Western security framework. That orientation was completely reversed by the revolution, transforming erstwhile allies into enemies. Since then, Tehran has mostly relied on non-state actors to exert influence, avoiding direct conventional conflict whenever feasible.

This is the most difficult test that model has faced in years. Routines have been disturbed by air raid sirens in Manama, home of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. Schools are no longer open. Flights were rerouted. The fighting has affected civilian infrastructure in addition to military targets. Iran claims it targets U.S. assets and denies purposefully targeting its Gulf neighbors. However, damage, whether intentional or not, modifies perceptions.

The unease among Gulf leaders who previously tried cautious reconciliation with Tehran is difficult to ignore. In an effort to de-escalate, some have recently reopened diplomatic channels. These efforts now appear brittle.

The oil markets are also responding. Fears of supply disruptions have caused prices to spike, which has benefited exporters like Russia even as instability grows. Ironically, while prolonged war threatens the larger regional order, higher oil prices benefit some of Iran’s economic allies.

Durability is the bigger question that looms over everything. Are Iran’s alliances based on a common anti-Israel and anti-US stance, or are they transactional? Or do they have the fortitude to resist constant military pressure?

The answer might have more to do with survival than ideology. Iran’s leadership is aware that maintaining deterrence can be achieved by projecting strength, even in a symbolic way. However, its allies have to consider international criticism, economic costs, and domestic stability.

There is a sense of multi-layered uncertainty as you watch this play out. There is a network in Iran. It has a noticeable impact on Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. However, alliances show their limitations when put to the test in direct combat against two militaries with superior technological capabilities.

Tehran can withstand adversity because resistance is valued in its political culture. However, perseverance does not equate to success. Allies may reassess if the war continues, if air defenses deteriorate, or if domestic discontent increases.

As of right now, Iran’s allies are speaking slowly, interacting sparingly, and refraining from making final promises. That prudence could be calculated. In an area where alliances are rarely absolute, it might also indicate the limits of allegiance.

War makes things clear. Uncomfortable at times. Furthermore, Iran’s network of allies appears to be under stress right now, acting unevenly and with strong rhetoric.